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INTRODUCTION

Large public corporations are business enterprises operated
for private gain, but they also are social institutions imbued with
a public interest.1 Debates in American legal circles about how
corporate managers should be held accountable and whether
corporations should be operated solely for the benefit of share* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International

Business Law, Brooklyn Law School BA. Radcliffe 1959; LL.B. New York University
1962. Professor Karmel is also a partner of Kelley Drye and Warren and was a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-80. The research assistance

of Brooklyn Law Student Jane Drummey is gratefully acknowledged.
I "Notwithstanding the pervasive intrusion of external government, corporation
boards and executives still make most of the decisions which affect the welfare of consumers, employees and the national economy." A.F. CoNARD. COoRPORIoNs IN PERSPEcTIvE 318 (1976).
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holders, or also with a view to the interests of society,
including
2

employees and the community, are of long standing.
Today's corporate governance debates focus on the role that
should be played by institutional investors, including public
pension funds. Professor Richard Buxbaum, in his Pomerantz
Lecture,3 has suggested that such investors may be pushing
United States corporations to the two-tier board model of German corporations. This Article will explore the current ferment
over corporate governance, describe various reform proposals
and suggest that institutional iivestors may be having a negative
influence on corporate governance. Their demand for a possibly
unreasonable return on their investments, in the form of takeover premiums or other dividends, has generated a wave of state
antitakeover litigation curtailing shareholder rights.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) has been unable to counter this trend, for both political
and legal reasons. Whether recent initiatives by the California
Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and other investor activists will change the SEC's course remains to be seen.
It is noteworthy that dufing the same period that shareholder
rights have eroded in the United States, the European Communities (EC) have been improving shareholders' rights through
federal legislation.
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to revive the debate
about whether a federal corporation law is needed.' Any such
law should impose obligations for appropriate capital structures
on institutional investors in addition to better protecting their
rights.

The debate between Professors Berle and Dodd in 1931 and 1932 formed the backdrop for sweeping New Deal reform legislation, including the first federal securities laws.
See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1931); Berle,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932);
Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932);
Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the FiduciaryDuties of CorporateManagers Practicable?, 2 U. CE:. L. REV. 194 (1935).
1 Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROoKLYN L. REv. 1 (1991).

" See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
L.J. 663 (1974).
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I.
A.

DEBATES ABouT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Past as Prologue

In the early years of the Great Depression, Berle and Means
reached the insightful and influential conclusion that there had
been a divorce between ownership and management in large
public corporations. 5 The political implications of this conclusion were then.hotly debated by Berle and Dodd, both of whom
argued by analogy, comparing corporations to governmental
agencies.' Dodd argued that the state should regulate the absolute control of corporate property exercised by corporate managers not only for the benefit of shareholders but also for society at
large. He viewed corporations as autocratic merchant states that
derived their power from the government and therefore had to
be brought under government control for the benefit of society
at large.7 Berle, by contrast, viewed corporate officers as representatives and was concerned about making corporate managers
more responsive to the economic interests of shareholders. He
hypothesized that shareholders had surrendered control of the
corporation to management and that such control needed to be
returned to shareholders through the enforcement of fiduciary
duties owed to them by officers and directors.8
The Dodd perspective was revived in the 1970s by consumer
advocate Ralph Nader, who expressed the view that corporations
are state agencies which enjoy special privileges in order to
achieve social or national ends. According to Nader, the consensual economic cornerstone for corporate privilege had crumbled
because of the breakdown of controls that historically legitimized corporate power. These controls were state chartering,
competition, remedial law, federal regulation, labor unions,
shareholders and the board of directors. In Nader's view, each
had failed to control or prevent irresponsible and unlawful conduct by corporate executives, individually and collectively. As a
& G. MEANS. THE MODERN COm'ORAION AND PluvAT Pnopnm'Y (1933).
' Berle, For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L Rsv.
1365, 1368 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the FiduciaryDuties of Corporate
Managers Practicable?,2 U. CH. L. REv. 194, 203-04 (1935).
7 Dodd, For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?,45 HAnv. L Rm. 1145, 1156
5 A. BERT

(1932).

8 Berle, CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HAv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Berle,
supra note 6, at 1367-68.
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result, giant, multinational corporations became private governments, exercising an influence on the quality of life for which
they were not held accountable. Nader's prescription was federal
chartering of corporations, which would restructure the board of
directors, redefine its relationships with management, employees
and shareholders, and regulate corporate disclosure and conduct
in certain significant areas of social concern.2
In response to the same political movement to reform large
corporations, a federal minimum standards corporation law was
advocated by Professor William Cary, former Chairman of the
SEC. 10 Cary, like Berle, was more concerned about making corporate officers and directors accountable to shareholders than he
was concerned about making corporations accountable to society
generally. The SEC then seized the flag of corporate governance
in what became a political battle to curtail the power of private
corporations and their management. This development was not
so much in response to the collapse of business power, as had
been the case in the early 1930s, but was due to a perception
that business had become too powerful, and also too corrupt.
Coincident with Harold Williams becoming Chairman of the
SEC, in April 1977, the Commission announced that it would
hold "public hearings concerning shareholder communications,
shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process, and,
more generally, corporate governance."" The background cited
for the need to focus public attention on the subject of corporate
accountability was the SEC's own enforcement program which
had resulted in the public exposure of a "wide variety of questionable and illegal corporate practices including bribes, kickbacks, illegal political contributions, and improper accounting
practices."' 2 The Commission's political predilections for reform
legislation were clearly set forth. The Commission stated that:
a number of proposals designed to achieve a new "corporate governance" have been suggested, including placing greater emphasis on the

role of outside directors and audit committees, increasing federal con-

'R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).

,0 Cary, supra note 4. See also Schwartz, A Case For Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
11 Reexamination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,482 (Apr. 28, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901, 23,902 (1977).
1"

Id. at 23,902 n.1.
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trol over corporate conduct through legislation which requires federal
chartering or setting of minimum standards of corporate conduct, and
providing mechanisms to assure a higher level of management accountability to shareholders through revisions of the Commission's
proxy rules.13

The SEC's threat to reform corporate governance by mandating boards of independent directors wai given teeth by the
views concerning independent directors expressed by Chairman
Williams. In one of his first speeches as SEC Chairman, he
stated that:
the large corporation has ceased to be private property--even though
theoretically-owned by its shareholders. It is now a quasi-public institution. If it is such a quasi-public institution, then the self-perpetuating oligarchy that constitutes management does not have the same
rights it once had."'

In Williams's opinion, the only way for the private sector to
stem the tide of increasing government regulation of business
and to fill the gap left by shareholder passivity was to make corporate power more accountable to the general public. The mechanisms by which Williams believed such accountability should
be achieved included a board composed entirely of persons not
in any way affiliated with the corporation except for the chief
executive officer. Further, the CEO should not be chairman of
the board because the substance and process of board deliberations should not be management's prerogatives.15 At the very
least, a board's nominating, compensation and audit committees
should be composed of independent directors, because these
committees are key elements in corporate accountability."'
The SEC's Corporate Governance Hearings, held in four cities around the United States, lasted many months. Following
the hearings, the Commission engaged in a number of rulemaking proceedings concerning the proxy rules. Although these rules
required increased public disclosure of board composition and
"' Id. at 23,902 (citations omitted).
Address on Corporate Ethics, by Harold IdL Williams, Chairman, SEC, American
Assembly, Columbia University 16 (Apr. 16, 1977).
15 Address on Corporate Accountability, by Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC,
Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, Calif. (Jan. 18, 1978).
18 Address on Corporate Accountability-One Year Later, by Harold A. Williams,
Chairman, SEC, Sixth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, Calif. (Jan. 18,
1979).
14
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board committees, none of the SEC's rulemaking proceedings
endeavored to regulate the substantive composition of the
board. 17 The staff report on the hearings concluded: "The board
of directors has come to be viewed by many as the center of
efforts to enhance corporate accountability. With an increased
number of truly independent directors and an effectively functioning committee system, an institutionalized process for holding management accountable will be created."18 Nevertheless,
the report did not include any legal recommendations as to
whether or how to create a board composed of independent directors controlling the nominating process.
The Business Roundtable basically agreed with the SEC
that the boards of large public corporations should be composed
of a significant number of outside or independent directors.19
However, business leaders found the SEC's proposed rulemaking
highly objectionable because it threatened to eliminate the separation of political and economic power on which the United
States private enterprise system had long depended. 20 As one
commentator expressed the matter:
The SEC then is not crusading only for reform of corporate governance. Whether or not the SEC knows precisely what it is doing, in fact
it is entering into a social, economic and political controversy over
whether corporations should remain essentially private property dedicated to economic purpose or should become essentially public prop21
erty dedicated to social ends.

There was one area of agreement between business leaders
and Chairman Williams. Both suspected that shareholders were
exacerbating corporate misconduct. Williams asserted that it
"7The SEC proposed the labeling of directors as "management," "affiliated nonmanagement," or "independent." Exchange Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978), 43
Fed. Reg. 31,945, 31,947 (1978). Because this raised a howl of protest from commentators, the final rules required only a brief description of "significant economic and personal relationships ... between the director and the issuer." Exchange Act Release No.
15,384 (Dec. 6, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522, 58,523 (1978) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a.
1 (1990)).
18 SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPoRATE AccouNTABILITy, PRINTED FOR USE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 579 (Sept. 4,

1980).
1" The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation,33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2105-08 (1978).
20 Id. at 2089-91.
"' Kohlmeier, SEC Seeks Governance Goals FarBeyond Its Mandate, FINANCIER,

Aug. 1978, at 8.
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was not in the long-term interests of corporations to pander to
short-term speculators in a corporate income stream.
The "shareholder" to which management should regard itself as accountable is not simply those individuals who happen to be shareholders today-or at any arbitrary point in time-but to "ownership" as
an institution over time. When the "shareholder" is viewed as a continuing, long-term group-even though its membership is changing
daily-there is far greater congruence between corporate activity in
the interests of its shareholders and the interests of the larger
society.'

Further, Williams suggested that if investors do not change their
attitudes to take a longer term view of corporate activity, we
should "unlink the income stream speculator from ownership in
"the role of debt so
American business," perhaps by increasing
23
that equity financing is less important."
During the 1980s, controversy about corporate governance
focused on The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project (the Project).24 This ongoing "prestatement" of the law
covers numerous areas of corporate law, only two of which will
be mentioned here. As to board structure and composition, the
Project advocates a monitoring model of corporate governance
with at least a majority of independent directors.25 Section 2.01,
which speaks to corporate purpose, provides that "[a] business
corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."12 6 Nevertheless, a corporation "may devote a reasonable amount of [its] resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes," without regard
to immediate economic gain.27
The most acrimonious objections to the Project's formulations concerning board structure, composition and objectives
='Address by Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC, Corporate Accountability and
Corporate Power, Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University 13 (Oct. 24, 1979).
3 Address by Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC, The Economy and the Future-The Tyranny of the Short-Run, the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Cal. 1718 (Nov. 21, 1980).
U See generally Perkins, The ALI CorporateGovernance Project in Midstream, 41

Bus. LAw. 1195 (1986).

"IPRmicias op CoRoRATE GovnnNANca ANALYsis

.04 (Tent. Draft 1984).
26

Id. § 2.01.

2Id.

AND REcoImmumATONS

§§ 3.02-
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came from the Business Roundtable.2 In the Roundtable's view,
the Project proposed significant changes in current law, while
using the form of a traditional Restatement. According to the
Roundtable, the Project recommended new law and formulated
black-letter rules in spite of conflicting case law and imposed
duties not required under current law.29 The Roundtable also attacked the Project's choice of one model of corporate governance, the monitoring model, to the exclusion of all others.30 Regarding the merits of the Project's theories on board
composition, the Roundtable's statement criticized the Project
for imposing "new rules and regulations on United States corporations which will serve only to decrease the risk-taking and
flexibility critical for corporate survival."3'
The Roundtable also objected to the emphasis on shareholder gain as a corporate objective, suggesting that corporations
have multiple bottom lines.32 As one astute observer remarked,
this criticism of the goal of shareholder wealth enhancement was
perhaps a mask for an argument to allow leeway to management
to oppose tender offers.33
B. The Takeover Mania
The long-term effects of the takeover mania of the 1980s
will not be known for some time. Persistent arguments that the
leveraging involved in many buyouts posed a danger to the
United States economy 4 fell on deaf ears until the collapse of
28 STATEMENT OF THE BusiNEss ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
PROPOSED PRINCIPLES

OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND

STRUCTuRE: RESTATEMENT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (Feb. 1983).
29 Id. at 2.

Id. at 20-27.
Id.at 35.
32 See Schwartz, Objective and Conduct of the Corporation,52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
511, 520 (1984) (quoting Comments of The Business Roundtable Concerning the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project 14-15 (unpublished memorandum,
May 4, 1984)).
Id.at 520.
"' See, e.g., Clark & Malabre, Borrowing Binge: Takeover Helps Push Corporate
Debt and Defaults Upward, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 6; Forstmann, Leveraged to the Hilt, Violating Our Rules of Prudence, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at 26, col.
5; Grant, Will History Repeat Itself?, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at 26, col. 3; Rohatyn,
Junk Bonds and Other Securities Swill, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1985, at 30, col. 3; Shad,
The Leveraging of America, Wall St. J., June 8, 1984, at 28, col. 4; Junk Bond Defaults
Are Expected to Increase, S & P Official Warns, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 334
"
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Drexel Burnham Lambert, which in turn led to the collapse of
the junk bond market.35
Scholarly opinion along a broad political spectrum during
favored takeovers as a corporate accountability mechthe 1980s
anism.3 6 Even the high levels of debt that resulted from many
buyouts were defended as a mechanism that compelled managers to work harder and eliminate inefficiency.37 The few strong
voices that decried the takeover boom 8 tended to speak for corporate managers39 or bondholders. 40 Even the SEC justified

-

takeovers as an appropriate corporate governance device.'1
Corporate managers saw events differently. Decrying takeovers as a threat to corporate values and structures, they resisted takeovers through a variety of corporate governance defenses.' 2 Business leaders, joined by labor groups, also persuaded
state legislatures to enact antitakeover laws.' 3 Such legislation
included "other constituencies" statutes, which permit directors
to take nonshareholder constituencies into account in making
corporate decisions." Such statutes go much further than a
(Mar. 4, 1988); Kaufman Voices Concern About Growing Debt, Volatility of Markets, 46
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 160 (Jan. 27, 1986).
35 See Siconolfi, Powe, Cohe & Guenther, Rise and Falk"Wall Street Era Ends as
Drexel Burnham Decides to Liquidate, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at Al, col 6.
38 See Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HAuv. L.
REv. 1028 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1161, 1169-73 (1951); Epstein, Who
Owns The Corporation?, A Twentieth Century Fund Paper (1986). See also Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL EcoN. 110, 112-18 (1965).
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 36, at 37-38; Jensen, The Takeover Controversy.
Analysis and Evidence, 4 MmLAN CORP. FN. J. 6, 13-14 (1986); Sobel, Junk Issues of
the Past and Future, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1990, at A14, col 3. See also They Will Return, ECONom~s, Feb. 9, 1991, at 19.
-"E.g., L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL SmRUn. SHorT-TMs GAiN Am
THE ABsENEr SHazioLDRa (1988).
39 See Lipton, CorporateGovernance in the Age of FinanceCorporatism,136 U. PA.
L REv. 1, 8-9 (1987).
4o See Bratton, CorporateDebt Relationships:Legal Theory In a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 95; McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L.
205, 206-07 (1988).
41 See Special Report: The Battle Over Tender Offer Reform: From the States and
the Courts to Congress, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 60, 69 (Jan. 15, 1988) [hereinafter
Battle Over Reform].
42 See Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 Wmam FoREST L. Ray. 121 (1990).
4- Lieberman & Bartell, The Rise in State Anti-Takeover Laws, 23 SEc. & COa.0DrnEs REG. 149 (Sept. 5, 1990).
4 Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 Bu& LAw. 2253 (1990).
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grant of wide discretion to directors involved in a contest for
corporate control and could change the traditional corporate law
standard covering corporate objectives and purposes. 45 While

only one statute mandates the subordination of shareholder gain
to the interests of other corporate groups such as employees,
customers and communities, all permit such societal preferences. 46 Although Delaware has not passed an "other constituencies" statute, its courts have accorded directors wide latitude in
responding to takeovers, including some consideration of matters other than the benefit to shareholders of the takeover
premium.47
An even more drastic change in laws and regulations pertaining to corporate governance that resulted from efforts to stifle takeovers was the erosion of shareholder voting rights, which
will be more fully described below. 48 It is ironic that by the end

of the 1980s business was appealing to state government to suppress takeovers by adopting the Dodd-Nader arguments that
employee and societal concerns were more important than shareholder profit.
C.

Current Proposals

Most current corporate governance proposals are aimed at
giving institutional shareholders greater voice. Generally, the
predicate behind these proposals is that management needs to
be disciplined and made more accountable to shareholders.
However, a few writers have predicated reform proposals on the
need for the modern public corporation to become more responsible to society. While all of these proposals recognize that the
institutionalization of the securities markets has created the
need for rethinking corporate governance, in the author's view
none of the current academic proposals comes to terms with the
movement to curb institutional investor power expressed by
state antitakeover and "other constituencies" legislation.
Professor Alfred Conard has urged the activation of institu-

Id. at 2268-69.
Id. at 2262-67.
41 See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
41 See text accompanying notes 104-121 infra.
40
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tional investors in order to curb managerial abuses.0 He has argued that current mechanisms for holding management accountable-derivative suits, shareholder proposals and independent
directors-have failed.50 Although Conard recognizes that the
substitution of "investor capitalism" for "managerial capitalism"
could mean the sacrifice of long-term goals for short-term goals,
an exacerbation of insider trading and even the entrenchment of
managers who ally with institutional investors, he nevertheless
believes these risks are worth the potential benefits of institutional control of corporate enterprise. These benefits might be
an enhancement of profitability, a cooling of the takeover wars
and rationalization of managerial compensation."1 In Conard's
view, pension fund socialism is no less likely to be socially responsible than managerial capitalism. 2 He therefore advocates
the liberation of institutional investors from control by their
sponsors and urges reform to give them access to management's
proxy statement. 53
Other academic writers of a more free market orientation
have likewise advocated the activation of institutional investors
and reforms that would free them to combine forces and act
more like the "proprietor-capitalists" of Germany and Japan
than the "punter-capitalists" of the United Kingdom and the
United States." Professor Bernard Black has argued that shareholders are passive in part because of legal constraints imposed
upon them by the SEC, bank regulators, and the Department of
Labor under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), as well as by antitrust laws and state corporation
law.5 5 In his view, these constraints should be removed so institutional investors can find their voice.5 6 Similarly, Professor
George Dent has urged that institutional investors combine to
assert control over business enterprises. 5 These views would jusConard, Beyond Managerialism:Investor Capitalism?,22 U. hMic. J.L. REP.117
(1988).

*0Id. at 126-30.
01 Id. at 163-72.
12

Id. at 172-74.
Id. at 177-78.

See Capitalism Survey: Punters or Proprietors,EcoNo=ss, May 5, 1990, at 5.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 fic. L. REv. 520 (1990).
SId.
"Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,1989
Wi. L. REV. 881, 908.
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tify the proposals for reform of the proxy rules made to the SEC
by the California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CalPERS) and United Shareholders of America (USA), which
will be discussed below.

8

The independent director solution to the problem of corporate accountability remains popular. Professor Jay Lorsch has
revived some of the ideas of Harold Williams, including the notion that the chairman of the board should be an independent
director.8 9 Professors Gilson and Kraakman have recommended
the creation of a cadre of paid professional directors who would
represent institutional investors.6 0 However, for all of the reasons cited by Lorsch as to why directors are not more effective-time constraints, information constraints and board room
social norms 61 -it is unlikely that this professor-director version
of the philosopher king will make corporations more profitable
or more socially responsible.
Professor Richard Buxbaum has examined the two-tier
model of large German corporations6 2 and concluded that representatives of institutional investors could function like the supervising board or board of overseers of the German Aktiengesellschaft, while other directors could function like the
managing or executive directors.63 Buxbaum advocates such an
evolution in corporate structure to encourage corporations to
better deal with environmental and other societal problems as
well as economic challenges. 64 While this model is interesting,
there is no reason to presume that tomorrow's institutional investors will be any more or less public-spirited or endowed with
business sense than today's directors.6 5
The most creative and controversial pending reform proposals have come from Martin Lipton, who is not an academic but a
See text accompanying notes 161-172 infra.
"J. LORSCH & E. MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPoRATE BOARDS 184-87 (1989).

" Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
J. LORSCH & E. MACIVER, supra note 59, at 83-91.
J1
'

See E.W. ERCKLENTZ, I MODERN GERMAN CORPORATION LAW 89-100, 115-19 (1979).
Buxbaum, supra note 3.

64 Id.
05 But see Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance:Beyond Berle and Means,
22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19, 75-79 (1988).
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corporate lawyer who invented the poison pill"6 and has generally defended incumbent managements against hostile takeovers. 67 Lipton and his partner, Steven Rosenblum, have proposed that directors be elected for five-year terms, removable
only for cause, and that such quinquennial election be based on
a five-year report and plan by the corporation.6 8 A majority of
the board would be required to be composed of independent directors.69 Under this plan any stockholder or group with 5 percent or $5 million of outstanding shares would have free access
to the proxy machinery.7 0 Quinquennial elections would be the
only means for a nonconsensual change of control, so all an71
titakeover devices and statutes would be repealed.
One serious question raised by Lipton's proposal, as well as
most of the other current reforms advocated, is how such
changes in corporate governance will be accomplished. Absent a
federal law mandating change in board structure and composition, it is unlikely that any radical corporate governance reform
will be accomplished. While particular states could impose such
change on their corporations, any legislation that threatens managerial autonomy is unlikely to be enacted because corporations
72
can easily migrate to a more manager-friendly jurisdiction.
Similarly, absent federal preemption, it is unlikely that state an73
titakeover legislation will be repealed.

" Poison pill plans involve the issuance to shareholders, as a dividend, of rights to
buy stock which, when exercised, unacceptably dilute the capital stock of a hostile bidder. Originally triggered only by mergers or similar business combinations, such plans
evolved to cover any sort of self-dealing transaction by a large stockholder. BRANcA.'o.
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND THE POT OF GOLD. 1989 UPDATE, REPORT FOR SUBCOMIuL ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HousE COMM ON ENERGY AND COsMMCc, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 90 n.82 (Comm. Print 101-K 1989) [hereinafter BRmcATO REPORT].
67 Lipton has defended management resistance to hostile takeovers in Corporate

Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L REV. 1 (1987).
" Lipton & Rosenblum, A Proposalfor a New System of Corporate Governance:
The QuinquennialElection of Directors,58 U. CHL . REv. 187 (1991) [hereinafter Quinquennial Proposal].
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See

Schwartz, Federal CharteringRevisited, 22 U. Mmcn. J.L. REP. 7 (1988).

73 See text accompanying notes 131-132 infra.
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The Berle and Means insight that ownership of large public
corporations had become divorced from management sparked
the corporate governance debates of the 1930s and continues to
motivate reform proposals. However, the insight of Dean Robert
Clark that the institutionalization of the securities market has
wrought an additional divorce of savings from professional investment is more relevant to current debates. 7 4 Institutional
money managers do not invest their own funds, but the funds of
others. The providers of capital in our economy are no longer
involved in the process of choosing investments, but decide only
whether to relinquish funds to a particular intermediary. 0
In 1980, institutions held 33 percent of all publicly quoted
American shares. Today, they are believed to own 45 percent.7
Pensions fund holdings are particularly large. By the end of
1989, pension funds owned an estimated 25-40 percent of publicly traded equities and they could own 50 percent by the year
200 0 .7 The percentage of ownership in the top 250 public companies, ranked by stock market value, is even greater. In 1989,
institutions held 50 percent of the stock in the top fifty public
corporations, 56.5 percent in the top 51-100 and 54.2 percent in
the top 101-250. 71 Moreover, institutional assets are heavily concentrated. At the end of 1988, the top thirty public and private
pension funds held approximately 27.3 percent of the asset value
of all such funds and 39.6 percent of the assets of the thousand
largest funds.79
The percentage of institutional participation in stock mar-

Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism:Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REV.561, 565-66 (1981).
"' Id. at 571.

7"A Word With Your Owners, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 1991, at 17.
" Letter from Richard H. Koppes, General Counsel, CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn,
Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC 3 (Nov. 3, 1989) [hereinafter CaIPERS
Letter].
"8Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A Summary of Economic Research at the Columbia Institutional Investor Project, Table 7
(June 14, 1990) [hereinafter Brancato].
" BRANCATO REPORT, supra note 66, at 129. See also White, Giant Pension Funds'
Explosive Growth Concentrates on Economic Assets and Power, Wall St. J., June 28,
1990, at C1, col. 3.
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ket activity is equally startling. Large block (10,000 or more
shares) transactions are a gauge of institutional trading. In 1977,
block trades represented 22.4 percent of reported volume on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). By 1987, large block transactions represented 45.9 percent of NYSE volume. 80
The institutionalization of the stock market has been accompanied by the growth of passive investment strategies, such
as indexing, and the use of derivative products.8 1 Program trading, commonly blamed for an assortment of stock market ills, is
one technique used in passive investment.8 2 Such trading strategies leave institutions open to the charge that they are shortterm investors or speculators in the income stream of large public corporations.8 Even if institutions hold equity investments
for a long period of time," the very size and diversity of their
holdings distinguishes them from traditional individual investors. They do not choose to invest in individual stocks based on
an analysis of fundamental values, but rather to invest in portfolios. Institutional trading habits have earned investors a variety
of epithets, ranging from "punter capitalists"8 5 to "takeover entrepreneurs." ' Pleas for "patient capital" investment strategies8 7 have alternated with ideas for government regulation of
stock market turnover. 8
Institutional investors are by no means monolithic. They include private and public pension funds, investment companies,

80 Report by the Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The October 1987 Market Break 111-2 (Feb. 1988).

8' Id. at HI-3.
82 See Katzenbach, An Overview of Program Trading and Its Impact on Current
Market Practices 4-5, 13, 21-22 (Dec. 21, 1987) (a study commissioned by the NYSE).
See O'Connell, Institutional Shareholders: New Gadflies, DmscroRsw, Jan.
1988, at 5; Rohatyn, Institutional "Investor" or "Speculator', Wall St. J., June 24,

1988, at 18, col. 4; Stout & Wessel, Brady Blasts Pension Fundsfor Taking Short-Term

View, Suggests Alternatives, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1990, at A2,col. 2; Williams, supra
note 23.
" CalPERS holds stock positions on average from 6 to 10 years. CaIPERS Letter,
supra note 77, at 2.
85See Capitalism Survey, supra note 54, at 5.
88 Lipton, supra note 67, at 14.

QuinquennialProposal,supra note 68; Report of the Governor's Task Force on
Pension Fund Investment, Our Money's Worth, New York State Industrial Cooperation
Council, June 1989, at 27-33 [hereinafter Governor's Task Force].
99 Recommendations have included a tax on short-term trading profits and various
proposals to reduce leverage in the trading of equities. See Rohatyn, supra note 83.
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insurance companies, bank trusts and foundations. 9 It can
therefore fairly be said that "virtually all of us are stockholders
in one way or another, whether through direct holdings, through
mutual funds or as beneficiaries of plans which invest in
stock."9 0 It has been argued, however, that limited stockholder
liability and the ease and rapidity of ownership transfer in liquid public securities markets give stockholders benefits not enjoyed by owners of most other forms of property, with an absence of corresponding social responsibility. 1 This responsibility
gap, coupled with the power of institutions to make changes in
corporate control, 92 has made business leaders quick to take umbrage at real or perceived threats by institutional investors to
managerial prerogatives.
B.

The Negative Impact of Institutional Investment

During the 1980s the pressure for high overall return by institutional investors in United States corporations resulted in an
unhealthy leveraging of United States corporations to meet that
demand. Net equity issues by United States nonfinancial institutions have been negative every year since 1984.2 In other
words, funds were borrowed to pay dividends to shareholders, in
the form of ordinary cash distributions, share repurchases or
takeover premiums. The net effect was the opposite of capital
formation: it was a liquidation of industry. Furthermore, the
transaction costs from this restructuring were huge and
industrial base into investment banksiphoned money from 9 our
4
fees.
attorney
ing and
To look at this phenomenon from another perspective, the
ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to nonfinancial corporate
"See Brancato, supra note 78, at Table 1.
oLetter from Richard H. Troy, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on the Proxy System, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC 24 (July 30, 1990) [hereinafter Corporate Secretaries
Letter].
Id.at 24-25.
92See E. HERMAN,

CORPORATE CONTROL,

CORPORATE POWER 63 (1981).

Tax Policy and CorporateBorrowing, in.PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERTHE DISTINCTIONs BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY DiSAPPEARING? 136 (R. Kopcke

"Auerbach,
ENcE ARE

& E. Rosengren eds. 1989) [hereinafter DEBT/EQUITY PROCEEDINGS].
See B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANs AT THE GATE 108, 187, 208, 220-21,

243, 254, 298-99, 317, 336-37, 390, 510 (1990); Brill, The Morning After, AM. LAW., Apr.
1990, at 5.
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gross domestic product rose from 52 percent in 1982 to over 67
percent by the end of 1988. 95 This shift of capital by United
States corporations from equity into debt was not for the purpose of financing real corporate growth. Rather, borrowers used
a major proportion of the proceeds of new debt to purchase either their own equity shares or the shares of other
corporations."8
Frequently the low level of capital formation in the United
States, in comparison to Germany and Japan, is attributed to a
lower savings rate.97 Further, the higher cost of capital in the
United States can be blamed on higher interest rates linked to
the federal budget deficit.s However, dividends are also higher
in the United States.99 Moreover, such dividends have frequently been paid out of capital.100
The result of this decapitalization of industry has been declining productivity of United States business and a declining
standard of living for most Americans. Productivity rose an avIl Bernstein, Discussion, in DEBT/EQUrry PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 93, at 129.
"Id. It should be noted that during the 19803 corporate pension funds were reducing their equity holdings in favor of debt holdings, whereas public pension funds were
doing the reverse. White, GiantPension Funds'Explosive Growth Concentrateson Economic Assets and Power, Wall St. J., June 28, 1990, at C1, col 3.
Altany, The Savings Pinch, Industry Week, Apr. 2, 1990, at 86; Holberton, The
Differing Cost of Capital,Fin. Times, June 1, 1990, § I, at 16.
9, See A. MALABRE, WmN OuR MEAs 51-52, 126 (1991); Plender, Malaise in
Need of Long-term Remedy, Fin. Times, July 20, 1990, § I, at 16, col. 3. In a global
capital market, however, the cost of capital can change because of transnational capital
flows. In the summer of 1990, the nominal bond yield in Japan was 7.5% and the inflation rate was 2.5%, whereas in the United States, the nominal bond yield was 8.4% and
the inflation rate was 5%. Japan therefore had higher long-term real interest rates, despite its higher savings rate. This occurred because Japanese investers found foreign investments more attractive. Task Force on InternationalCompetitiveness of U.S. Financial Institutions,How Should the U.S. Respond to the Japanese Challengein Financial
Services?, in Hearing before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutionsSupervision,Regulation and Insurance, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (Aug. 2, 1990). While such transnational capital flows have serious
implications for corporate governance, their discussion is beyond the scope of this
Article.
"Keppler, The Importance of Dividend Yields in Country Selection, J.Ponwlozo
MGrr. 24 (Winter 1991); Rudnick, Safe Trading Without Tricks, The Times, Dec. 11,
1990. The national interest may require investors to forego such dividends. See Regan,
Pension Funds: New Power, New Responsibility, Wall St. J., Nov. 2,1937, at 28, Col 3.
100 See Dividends in Recession, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1991, at 16; GM's Payout,
Spending Cuts, Layoffs Spark Mixed Reaction by Analysts; Bears Have Edge, Wall St.
J., Feb. 6, 1991, at C2, col 3. See also Lombo, Annual Report on American Industry,
FoRBEs, Jan. 8, 1990, at 238.
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erage of about one percent a year during the 1980s, slightly less
than the poor performance of the 1970s and the worst productivity showing for any decade of the century. 10 1 Similarly, although
investment bankers and attorneys may have made spectacular
earnings during the 1980s, other workers saw their wages steadfly deteriorate. 102
Institutional investors hardly deserve all of the blame for
this dire state of economic affairs. Plenty of blame can also be
leveled at government officials, corporate managers and even
academics spouting free market ideologies. 0 3 Nevertheless, investors deserve to be held accountable for the highly questionable capital distributions that were made to them during the last
half of the 1980s. Further, large institutions dominate the markets to such an extent that they now threaten to become a capital cartel.

III.

THE EROSION OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

A.

Developments at the State Level

During the 1980s institutional investors threatened the autonomy of corporate managers and directors, who then exploited
fears and suspicions of the takeover mania by labor and the
public to insulate themselves from accountability. This insulation was accomplished through antitakeover legislation, the destruction of shareholder voting power, Delaware court decisions
approving actions to thwart takeovers and new state laws eliminating liability for breach of the duty of care.
The basic duties of care and loyalty that directors of United
States corporations owe to their corporation and its shareholders
are governed by state corporation law. 104 The burdens imposed
upon directors by these twin duties are threshold requirements
101Raising Productivity Will be Tough in the '90's, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1990, at Al,
col. 5.
102

Uchitelle, Not Getting Ahead? Better Get Used to It, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1990,

§ 4, at 1, col. 4.
10'

The author previously made this case in Karmel, A Decade of Greed, N.Y.L.J.,

Mar. 1, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
104

The duty of care is that degree of skill, diligence and care that an ordinary pru-

dent person would exercise in similar circumstances. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.30 (1984). The duty of loyalty requires directors who have a conflict of interest to
demonstrate the fairness of a transaction in which they are interested. 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 931 (perm. ed. 1986).
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that must be met before a court will apply the business judgment rule, which shields directors from liability for disinterested
business decisions made with due care, in good faith and without
an abuse of discretion. 105 Classic corporation law principles concerning the duties of care and loyalty and the business judgment
rule have been severely strained by the takeover battles of the
past decade.
In reaction to the highly publicized Smith v. Van Gorkom
case, 106 which imposed liability on directors for failure to exercise due care in a change of control situation, Delaware and numerous other states passed legislation permitting corporations to
limit or eliminate the personal liability of directors for breach of
the duty of care. 10 7 However, in cases involving target company
defenses against hostile takeovers, the line between the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty sometimes became blurred because
courts recognized that directors often are interested in remaining in office.' 08
In the context of a takeover, the business judgment rule
grants the same protection to directors as in any other context.
However, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 00 the Delaware Supreme Court developed two prerequisites for the application of the business judgment rule to antitakeover measures.
First, the board must demonstrate good faith and a reasonable
investigation to prove that protection of the corporate enterprise
105 D. BLOc,

1989).

N. BARTON & S. RADiN, THE Busum ss JUDGmEr RuLE 1-4 (3d ed.

A.2d 858 (DeL 1985). This case and its aftermath are discussed in A.
FEtOmsFm G. HAZARD & M. Kappx BoARD GALas (1988).
107 In Delaware shareholders can adopt a charter provision limiting or even eliminating the personal liability of a director except for breach of the duty of loyalty or
intentional misconduct. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974 & Supp. 1983). Many
other states have followed this approach. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. Lw § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Other states have simply lowered the duty of care. See Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L.
Rav. 171, 174-77 (1987). Some have even suggested that directors be permitted to opt out
of duty of loyalty obligations. See generally Branson, Assault on Another Citadel:Attempts to Curtailthe FiduciaryStandardof Loyalty Applicable to CorporateDirectors,
57 FoRDHAm L Rv. 375, 376 (1988).
103 When a board fights a takeover, there is the danger that it is "acting primarily in
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders" Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (DeL 1935), later proceeding,
Silverzweig v. Unocal Corp., No. 90-78 (DeL Ch. Jan. 19, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
108488

1o Id.
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and shareholders is necessary. Second, defensive measures must
be reasonable in the face of the threat posed.
This notion of the Delaware Supreme Court that a takeover
is a "threat" is curious, but significant. It presumes that a corporation is an entity of economic and societal importance with an
appropriate will to survive. 110 Therefore, directors can use their
business judgment to keep a corporation independent. This conclusion put the blessing of the highest court in the state where
about half of the country's major corporations are incorporated 1 on a wide variety of poison pills and other mechanisms
designed to ward off unwelcome takeovers.1 2
On a certain level, the Delaware Supreme Court was forced
to recognize the legitimacy of management resistance to hostile
takeovers because other state legislatures were passing antitakeover legislation. Such statutes include "other constituencies"
laws, 13 business combination laws," 4 control share laws"" and
fair price laws."" All of these statutes have the effect of depriving a shareholder who obtains a controlling interest in a corporation from effecting a change of control without the consent of
the corporation's board of directors or other shareholders. Directly or indirectly, this is accomplished by sterilizing the shareholder's vote. In the most extreme antitakeover statute yet
passed, in Pennsylvania, which includes "other constituencies"
and control share provisions, shareholders also are required to
11 See

Gilson, supra note 42, at 127.
, Lipton & Rosenblum, QuinquennialProposal, supra note 68, at 198 n.27.
112 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). An analysis of the various mechanisms used to frustrate takeovers is beyond the scope of this Article. Shareholder activists argue all such devices should be put to a shareholder vote before they are activated.
See Machold, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There
Lessons From Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 751, 752, 760. The Delaware Supreme
Court has rejected this plea. See also text accompanying note 119 infra.
' ' See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 44.
1 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (Consol. Supp. 1989) which prohibits most
New York corporations from entering into a "business combination" with a 20% stockholder for 5 years after the stockholder has acquired such 20% block, unless the board of
directors approves prior to such acquisition. Any business combination after the 5-year
period must be approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders or satisfy a fairprice test.
115 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (West 1989). Shares acquired
in a "control share acquisition" (purchase of 20% or other higher threshold block) automatically lose their voting rights unless a majority of disinterested shareholders approve,
" See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1 (Baldwin 1991).
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disgorge any trading profits made within eighteen months of a
failed attempt to change control through a buyout or proxy
117
contest.
The general attitude of the states toward this diminution in
shareholder voting power was perhaps best summarized by
Chancellor Allen in Lennane v. ASK Computer Systems, Inc.,' 8
which involved the issuance of stock in violation of a shareholder participation listing requirement-such a violation could
trigger a delisting. According to the Chancellor, the relationship
between the directors' duty of loyalty and the shareholders' voting franchise is complex.
Directors are bound to accord great deference and respect to the
shareholder vote as provided in the corporation's constitutional documents. A right to vote that arises only from director action is not constitutional in this sense, and with respect to such right, directors are
bound simply to exercise their business judgment in an effort to promote the welfare of the corporation and the shareholders derivatively.
Therefore, a vote of that type where it reasonably may be seen as
endangering the accomplishment of a transaction that directors in
good faith believe is in the corporation's best interest, may present a
threat against which directors may act without breaching a faith with
shareholders. Directors are not required in all instances to follow
shareholder views of advantageous corporate action. 110

The rapid success enjoyed by business leaders in persuading
state legislatures and courts to shift so much power from shareholders to managers and directors could not have occurred without the support of labor and the public. This support was particularly strong in states with mature industrial companies
confronting a long-term United States decline in manufacturing
employment. 120 Furthermore, when jobs are at stake, pension
117 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2571 (Purdon Supp. 1991).
See Shargel & Mitchell, Pennsylvania'sNew Anti-Takeover Legislation, 24 Rev. Sec. &
Commodities Reg. (S & P) 7 (Jan. 9, 1991). Institutional investor opposition to this bill
was fierce, and as a result the statute includes an ability to opt-out, which numerous
public companies have done. Klein & Greenbaum, Many Pa. Companies Opt Out, Nat'l
Law J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 15.
n28[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 195,674 (Oct. 11, 1930). Similarly, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), afr'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1930), the
continuation of the corporation as an independent entity was given a higher value by the
court than shareholder choice or a takeover premium to shareholders.
9 [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 1 98,155.
12 See Johnson & lillon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87
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funds are in a poor position to fight for managerial accountability to shareholders.121
B.

The Limited Federal Interest
Corporate governance is primarily a matter of state corpora-

tion law. This was expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in a non-securities law case as follows:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
respect to stockholders,
state law will govern the internal affairs of the
1 22
corporation.

Thereafter, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,2 3 the Court

applied this principle in a case arising under the federal securities laws involving a short form merger. Under Delaware law
owners of at least ninety percent of a subsidiary's stock may

merge with that subsidiary without requesting the consent of
minority shareholders-who, in turn, must receive fair value for
their shares. In their complaint, the minority shareholders in
Santa Fe did not allege any material misrepresentation or omission. Rather, they argued that the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws were applicable to a breach of corporate
fiduciary duty, in that the majority shareholders were not pursuing a legitimate corporate purpose. The Court, however, refused
to apply Rule 10b-5 to allegations of internal corporate mismanagement. It stated:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to

federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state

MICH. L.

RE. 846, 852-53 (1989); Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes,
73 VA. L. REv. 111, 120-22 (1987).
' Despite declining overall U.S. productivity, see text accompanying note 101
supra, productivity per U.S. worker increased 3.6% between 1979 and 1990. They Will
Return, ECONoMisT, Feb. 9, 1991, at 19. Further, manufacturing grew as a proportion of
GNP from 20% in 1982 to over 23% in 1990. Id. This suggests that the corporate
restructurings of the 1980s assisted in the downsizing of the U.S. workforce engaged in
manufacturing. See Ryan, Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin Parachute,64 TuL. L. REv. 3, 5-14 (1989).
"' Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
223430

U.S. 462 (1977).
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policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.",

In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,2 5 the Supreme
Court indicated that Santa Fe would not be confined to its facts,
but rather was a general holding concerning fiduciary duty.
Schreiber raised the issue of whether the withdrawal of a hostile
tender offer bid and the substitution of a partial bid, following
negotiations with the target company's management, constituted
a manipulative act under the Williams Act.1 20 The Court held

that the term "manipulation" in sections 10(b) and 14(c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)127 should be
.similarly interpreted and that manipulative acts require misrepresentation or nondisclosure. These cases halted and even reversed the development of a federal corporation law through a
line of decisions8 in the federal courts under section 10(b) of the
12
Exchange Act.

Even with regard to securities law, federal regulatory coverage is limited. All of the states have state securities laws, commonly called blue sky laws, many of which preceded the federal
securities laws. Some of these laws are merit regulation statutes,
which give a blue sky commissioner the authority to prevent an
issuer from selling its securities in the state when the offering or
the issuer's capital structure is substantively unfair or presents
excessive risks to the investor. 129 In a trio of cases decided sixteen years before the first federal securities law was passed, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
state blue sky laws on the ground that they were only applicable
to dispositions of securities within the state and thus did not
3°
burden interstate commerce.1
124

Id. at 479.

125472

U.S. 1 (1985).
"' The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained in §§ 13(d)-(e) and
14(d)-() of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-()
(1988) and the regulations thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13e-101, 240.14a-1 to
14f-1 (1990).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), n(e) (1988).
12 See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law". An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. Rv.
1146, 1148 (1965); Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-andof the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L Rxv. 383 (1964).
29 Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAw.
785, 787 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Report].
120 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Fals Stock
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State antitakeover statutes raised more serious constitutional questions. However, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America,3 1 the Supreme Court held that an Indiana control
share act was neither preempted by the Williams Act nor made
unconstitutional by reason of the commerce clause. Rather, the
Court asserted that "[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to reguthe authority to define the
late domestic corporations, including
1 32
shareholders.
of
rights
voting
C.

The One Share, One Vote Controversy

Although most state corporation statutes enunciate a oneshare, one-vote standard, this standard is not mandatory. The
articles of incorporation can provide otherwise.13 3 As a general
matter, there is no prohibition against the issuance of nonvoting
common stock or any requirement that voting control be commensurate with economic investment. While some state blue sky
laws have required fair shareholder voting rights, which are related to the relative economic investments of insiders and the
public, these statutes have been watered down in recent years by
permitting corporations to recapitalize and issue limited voting
134
shares which receive a higher dividend.
Disenfranchisement of shareholders who already have voting rights or voting control is more problematic than original issue nonvoting stock, but such a taking of this incident of stock
ownership is increasingly condoned. Changes in voting rights, or
the dilution of a class of stockholders with voting rights, is accomplished by amending the certificate of incorporation. In New
York and Delaware, this is accomplished first by a vote of the
board, and then by the holders of a majority of all outstanding

Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
131481 U.S. 69 (1987).
"I Id.at 89. Although the SEC argued that the Indiana control share statute was an
impermissible burden on commerce, it failed to argue that the law was preempted by the
Williams Act, acceding to the states' rights policies of the Reagan Administration.
133 See Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982); 2 MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT ANN. § 7.21 (3d ed. Supp. 1986).
134 See NASAA Statement of Policy, Non-Voting Stock, NASAA Reports (CCH) 1
2401, at 1401 (adopted Sept. 17, 1980). Contractual protection of such a dividend right,
similar to protections given to preferred stockholders, is not necessarily provided.

1991]

FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW

shares entitled to vote.135 A dissenting shareholder can receive
appraisal rights, but a majority can then disenfranchise
or re30
strict the votes of common stockholders indefinitely.
For large public corporations, however, the New York Stock
Exchange has provided a national one-share, one-vote standard
for common stockholders for over sixty years. Although a oneshare, one-vote standard had been common for corporate ownership after the Civil War, a variety of pyramiding and other
devices enabled managements with minor equity interests to
maintain control of public corporations after the public began
trading in listed equities in the 1920s. Then, in 1925, Dillon
Read & Company financed its acquisition of control over Dodge
Brothers, Inc. by paying only $2.5 million for an enterprise
worth $130 million through the issuance of nonvoting common
and preferred stock.1 8
As a result of public and academic outrage over this
event,13 9 in 1926 the NYSE disapproved an issue of nonvoting
common stock and stated that the Exchange, in considering applications for the listing of securities, would give careful thought
to the matter of voting control. Thereafter, the NYSE refused to
list any company with nonvoting common stock or any company
with more than one class of common stock having disparate voting rights. Moreover, the NYSE delisted the stock of any
com40
pany that created a class of nonvoting common stock.
In 1986, the NYSE filed with the SEC proposed amendments to its voting rights policies under which disparate voting
rights stock, if created as part of a recapitalization by a public
company, would have been allowed if approved by a majority of
the company's independent directors and a majority of the votes
eligible to be cast by its public directors. 1 4 An initial distribu-

131 Dm. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a), 242 (1990); N.Y. BusinEss CoRn. Lw, §§ 801-04
(McKinney 1990).
,3' See N.Y. Busimnss Cop. LAw § 806 (McKinney 1990).
13' Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common
Shares-TheirHistory, Legality and Validity, 15 SEc. REG. J. 37, 48-50 (1987).
13 Loomis & Rubman, Corporate Governance in HistoricalPerspective, 8 HorsTRA

L Rxv. 141, 152-53 (1979).

13' Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 687, 694-98 (1936).
140 NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A) & (C) (repealed).
141 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-23,724 (Oct. 17 1988), 51 Fed. Reg.
37,529 (Oct. 22, 1986).
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tion of weighted voting stock could have been listed.142 After
holding public hearings, the SEC refused to approve the proposed NYSE relaxation of its listing standards and instead
promulgated Rule 19c-4 under the Exchange Act which prohibited all exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) from listing the stock of any corporation that takes any
action to nullify, restrict or disparately reduce the per share voting rights of common stockholders.143
In The Business Roundtable v. SEC,1 44 the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated Rule 19c-4.
The court determined that the NYSE amendment to its listing
standard was a "rule" required to be filed with and approved or
disapproved by the SEC. However, it found that the SEC's Rule
19c-4 substitution for the NYSE standard was invalid because it
was not in furtherance of any purpose of the Exchange Act.
Rather, the court found that the rule directly controlled the substantive allocation of powers among classes of shareholders and
impinged severely on the tradition of state regulation of corporate law. It therefore invalidated the rule on the authority of
Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green, discussed above. 43 The logic
of this case is problematic, both as a matter of statutory construction and public policy, but it surely casts a pall over SEC
corporate governance rulemaking. 46 Although the NYSE has
a
maintained Rule 19c-4 as a listing standard for the present,
47
likely.
is
rights
voting
shareholder
of
further deterioration
Id.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,888 (June 11, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 41,125
(June 18, 1980). Sections 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act give the SEC the power to
approve, disapprove, abrogate, add to or delete from rules of SROs. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b),
(c) (1988).
144 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
145 See text accompanying notes 123-124 supra.
148 To conclude that the SEC must review SRO rules but cannot judge their substantive merit makes a mockery of the administrative process. Elsewhere, the author has
argued that the SEC had ample authority to adopt Rule 19c-4. Karmel, Qualitative
Standards For "Qualified Securities" SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U.L,
REv. 809, 828-30 (1987). A better reasoned decision of the Third Circuit upholds the
exercise of power by the SEC to thwart certain frustrating action by management confronted with a hostile bid. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988), later
proceeding, Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1311 (D.C. Del.
1989). The SEC was weakened, in the author's view, by its failure to argue, no doubt for
political reasons, that authority for Rule 19c-4 could be found under the Williams Act.
"' See Hooper, Panel Says Amex Should Ease Rule on 1 Share, 1 Vote, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 15, 1991, at C9, col. 5.
142

143
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In the view of some observers, commenting on The Business
Roundtable case, "the outlook for shareholder rights is fairly
dismal, and neither state legislatures nor courts can be counted
on to help re-establish the relevance of shareholders in corporate
governance.

1 48

Indeed, any such assistance will have to come ei-

ther from the SEC, whose authority has been called into question by the cases discussed above, or Congress. Although bills to
require that common stock traded on national exchanges have
uniform voting rights were introduced prior to The Business
Roundtable decision, they made no progress. 140 Whether such
legislation will be better received in the future is an open
question.
D.

Tender Offer Reform
The failure of Congress to enact any tender offer reform legislation during the 1980s does niot augur well for one-share, onevote federal legislation at this time. In 1984, an advisory committee to the SEC recommended various reforms under the Wlliams Act that would have curbed tender offer abuses and, in
addition, prevented certain management efforts to thwart hostile
takeovers.1 50 Among other things, the advisory committee recommended closing the so-called 13(d) window by more prompt
reporting of large scale purchases of stock, a twenty percent cap
on acquisitions of a company's stock in the open market, extensions of time for tender offers to remain open and shareholder
advisory votes on certain defensive tactics, including shareholder
disenfranchisement and change of control compensation (golden
parachutes).1 5' The SEC translated only a few of these recommendations into proposed legislation and submitted them to
Congress. Although Congress held extensive hearings and nu"8 McNew & Seglias, GerrymanderingComes to CorporateAmerica, Legal Times,
Aug. 27, 1990, at 19.
19 See, e.g., H.R. 2783, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 18, 1985); S. 1314, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (June 18, 1985); S. 1794, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 14134 (Sept. 18,
1989).
150 SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations (Securities and Exchange Commission, July 8, 1983), reprinted in [1933-84 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,511 (Mar. 28, 1984).
1

Id.

152 See MEmoRANDuM OF THE SEC REGARDING 5693. AS AAENDED AND ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE Co~m'rr=E ON ENERGY AN CowmcE, HR. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1984), reprinted in [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,659
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merous tender offer reform bills were introduced, no legislation
was ever passed.15 This occurred in part because of the political
impasse between the SEC, the Administration and Congress
concerning the basic question of whether tender offers were beneficial or detrimental and questions about the proper federal role
in matters affecting corporate governance.
The SEC and the Reagan Administration generally favored
15 4
tender offers as a free market, corporate-control mechanism.
On the other hand, the Administration was committed to states'
rights and generally was opposed to any federal corporate governance regulation, a view that the SEC then adopted."' 5 This
stance was a marked departure from the SEC's position in 1980
that the Exchange Act be amended to specifically preempt state
takeover laws.15 After the Supreme Court decided the CTS case
encouraging the states to adopt takeover legislation,15 7 SEC
obeisance to states' rights dogma led to the rather incongruous
result that the SEC opposed its own recommendations to reform
the Williams Act.158 In the meantime, key members of Congress
began to develop a consensus that takeovers were having a detrimental effect on the economy and should be curbed.1 9 Accordingly, Congress passed tax legislation to take the profit from two
popular takeover defense tactics, greenmail and golden
parachutes, but then permitted the states to give corporate managements the power to thwart takeovers. 160

(Sept. 7, 1984). H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) went beyond the SEC's recommendations aimed at facilitating tender offers and protecting shareholders and would
have: extended the minimum tender offer period from 20 business days to 40 calendar
days; closed the 13(d) window, required bidders to disclose the community impact of an
offer; prohibited self-tenders without a shareholder vote; prohibited the issuance of more
than 5% voting securities without a shareholder vote; prohibited golden parachutes during a tender offer; and prohibited greenmail.
'63 See Battle Over Reform, supra note 41.
2" Id.
15 See Administration Group Rejects Proposal to Enter Debate on Corporate
Takeovers, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 819 (June 5, 1987).
"I Memorandum of the SEC to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Proposing Amendments to the Williams Act, reprinted in [1979-80 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,453 (Feb. 15, 1980).
, See text accompanying notes 113-117, 131-132 supra.
'" Leefeldt, A Sweet Way to Foil Takeover Bids, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1985, at 24,
col. 4; Commission Will Not Reintroduce Takeover Legislation Package, Shad Says, 17
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 573 (Apr. 5, 1985).
* Battle Over Reform, supra note 41.
SI.R.C. §§ 162(k), 280G (1988). See Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal
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Even if one assumes the evils of takeovers, the problem with
the resolution of the public policy questions at issue is that the
shareholder mechanism for holding management accountable
was seriously damaged. Moreover, assigning the responsibility
for regulating takeovers to the states may prove a poor strategy
for United States corporations active in international securities
markets.
E. Response by InstitutionalInvestors
The growing evidence in the late 1980s that managements
were insulating themselves from accountability as well as hostile
takeovers sparked proposals to the SEC by shareholder activists.
CalPERS submitted to the SEC a request for a rulemaking project which would involve a comprehensive review of the proxy
system under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.01 This request
proposed forty-eight separate changes in the proxy rules, divided
into four categories: (a) structure and procedure; (b) shareholder
communications; (c) enhancement of disclosure; and (d) SEC filing and review of proxy materials. 62 At the heart of these proposals is an argument that institutional investors should be permitted to communicate freely with one another and to combine
to force corporate governance reforms on public companies. As a
predicate for such change, CalPERS asserted that the proxy
rules discourage responsible, long-term investors from playing a
meaningful role in the governance of public corporations by restricting shareholder access to the corporate proxy statement.
Particular grievances cited by CalPERS included resistance to
the provision of shareholder lists, management methods for
counting votes on shareholder proposals, and delays and inconsistencies in SEC staff reviews of proxy materials. 01 3
The CalPERS rulemaking petition was subsequently supported by the United Shareholders Association (USA) which
submitted a similar request for comprehensive revisions to the
federal proxy rules." The USA petition was more general than

Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeouer Defenses: The New Section 5881
Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FL. L. REv. 789 (1988).

15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988).
162

'
1

CalPERS Letter, supra note 77.
Id. at 7-8.
Letter from Ralph V. Whitworth, Director, USA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
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the CalPERS submission and argued that reform of the proxy
process to allow shareholders a meaningful corporate governance
role could forge a fundamental realignment of the now conflicting interests of management and shareholders. According to
USA, such a realignment would maximize value on a constant
basis, rather than through one-time restructuring
1 5
transactions.

6

Specific reforms urged by USA included confidential proxy
voting; independent third party tabulation of proxies; access to
management's proxy by any shareholder or group beneficially
owning 3 percent or $1 million of a corporation's voting equity
securities; greater accessibility of shareholders to the beneficial
shareholders' list; the adoption of an SEC rule requiring a shareholder vote on the adoption of any management entrenchment
devices such as greenmail, golden parachutes or poison pills; and
significant liberalization or elimination of the preclearance provisions of the proxy rules.
Business groups soon organized to attack this effort to enlist
the SEC in a corporate governance initiative on behalf of institutional shareholders. The American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (the Society) generally objected to the CalPERS and
USA proposals, which it viewed as improper efforts to create
special rights and privileges for large stockholders; to convert
the annual proxy process into an unwieldy annual massive multiparty referendum; to mandate secrecy among business associates and cover up possible conflicts of interest through
mandatory confidential voting; to stretch federal securities laws
to change state corporate law; and to remove from proxy rule
regulation the solicitation of large blocks of votes and the activities of self-appointed public interest groups. 168 Indeed, the Society urged the SEC to review "whether, in view of the growing
concentration of ever larger amounts of stock in ever fewer
hands, the proxy rules continue to achieve their statutory
67
purpose.

1

In the Society's view, stockholders, although technically
"owners," are really only "investors" since they have no respon-

SEC (Mar. 20, 1990).
"' CaIPERS Letter, supra note 77, at 9-10.
" Corporate Secretaries Letter, supra note 90, at 3.
167 Id.
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sibilities for corporate. activity. Accordingly, they should not be
given any role in directing corporate affairs. Shareholders own
only stock; the corporation owns corporate property.'" "Directors are retained to manage the affairs of the corporation and
take the responsibility for doing so."' 9
A comment by the Business Roundtable on the SEC's review of the proxy rules was even more pointed in questioning
the claims by institutional investors to greater voice in the proxy
process. 7 0 In the view of the Roundtable, the proxy system already provides shareholders with an effective voice in corporate
governance and "the ability of many institutions to contribute
meaningfully to corporate performance has been limited by their
choice of investment strategy. '1 7' After criticizing the short-term
horizons of institutional investors as well as indexation, the
Roundtable expressed the view that "[u]nless institutional investors develop the ability to analyze and understand the longterm competitive performance of the companies in which they've
invested, it's hard to see how their involvement in corporate governance will have a positive effect on corporate performance or
2
U.S. competitiveness."17
IV.
A.

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

A Changing SEC Philosophy

The internationalization of the securities markets has not
only changed the markets, but it has changed the work and philosophy of the SEC. Internationalization initiatives now have a
high priority and have been proceeding at a rapid pace. 7 3 Especially important are the proposals for facilitating multijurisdictional offerings. 7 4 The long-term objective of international regu-

"e
UB
170

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 23.
Letter from H.B. Atwater, Jr., Chairman, Task Force on Corporate Governance,

The Business Roundtable, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance,
SEC (Dec. 17, 1990).
1 Id. at 4.
172 Id.

at 4-5.
M7'
The author has summarized the most important of these developments in
Karmel, New Rules For Trading Foreign Securities, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1990, at 3, coL 1.
"I"Exchange Act Release No. 6,841 (July 24, 1989), 64 Fed. Reg. 32,226 (Aug. 4,
1989) (the original proposal); Exchange Act Release No. 6,879 (Oct. 22, 1990), 55 Fed.
Reg. 46,288 (Nov. 2, 1990) (amended proposal).
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lators with regard to international offerings is the development
of a common prospectus that would contain financial statements
prepared according to international accounting standards. 17 r Ac-

complishment of this goal has been complicated by the existence
of state blue sky laws alongside of the federal securities laws.
Because every securities offering must comply not only with the
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,176 but also
with the registration provisions of all of the states, only federal
preemption of state blue sky law for international offerings
could assure that an accord reached by the SEC with foreign
securities regulators on disclosure requirements for multijurisdictional offerings would bind state securities regulators. 1 7
The EC has been developing such a system of federal preemption by the establishment of minimum disclosure standards
for securities offerings. If the minimum standards set forth in
the relevant EC directives are met, mutual recognition of the national disclosure standards of any member state is compelled.1 7 8
This state of affairs is pushing the SEC toward a demand for
federal preemption of blue sky laws. SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden has complained that as of 1991 Great Britain will allow
the use of a prospectus filed in Berlin, but it will not be legal to
use automatically a prospectus fied with the SEC in
17 9
California.

One problem with exempting state blue sky regulation, however, is that the states, rather than the SEC, have imposed merit
regulation on corporate capital structures. Merit regulators can
change the internal structure of a securities issuer, the relations
among insiders and outsiders and the terms of an offering for
the purpose of protecting investors.180 Stock exchange listing re175 See Karmel, The IOSCO Venice Conference, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
See also Exchange Act Release No. 6,568 (Mar. 1, 1985), 50 Fed. Reg. 9,281 (Mar. 7,
1985).
176 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
177 The author has made this argument in greater detail in Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit
Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105,
106-07 (1987). See ABA Report, supra note 129, at 787.
178 See Proposalfor a Public Offer Prospectus Directive, 32 O.J. EuR. CoMi. (No. L
124) 8 (1989); EC Mutual Recognition of Listing ParticularsDirective, 30 O.J. Eu.
COMM. (No. L 185) 81 (1987); 32 O.J. Eut. CoMm. (No. C 101) 13 (1989).
179 Breeden Repeats Call ForPermitting U.S. Firms to Invest in Domestic Banks,
23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 115, 116 (Jan. 25, 1991).
18l ABA Report, supra note 129, at 823. Such regulation includes offering price re-
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quirements also have imposed merit standards on issuers. For
this reason, state blue sky laws customarily have a "blue chip"
exemption from state registration for offerings by listed companies. 151 The one-share, one-vote standard was an example of
such regulation and its demise represents the vulnerability of
SRO merit regulation.
Foreign stock exchanges also frequently have merit standards. 82 On the other hand, most foreign issuers that have securities which trade in the United States are not listed, and
therefore they are not eligible for the blue chip exemption.'"
Furthermore, even those foreign issuers that are listed are exempt from the corporate governance listing standards applicable
to United States issuers.'"
If the SEC were seriously to promote the concept of preemption of state blue sky laws, Congress would have to address
the policy question of what, if any, merit standards should be
injected into the federal securities laws. This question has be-

strictions and restrictions against excessive dilution. See H. SowARDs & N. HIRSCH. BusxNESS ORGANIZATIONS-BLUE SKY REGULATION § 7A.02 [2] (Cum. Supp. 1990); Brandi, Securities Practitionersand Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments and a Ranking of
States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP.L 689, 697-98 (1985).
"' See ABA Report, supra note 129, at 833-35; see also NASD Proposes Corporate
Governance Requirements to Aid Blue Sky Exemptions, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
589 (Apr. 5, 1985).
182 On the London International Stock Exchange ("ISE"), for example, traditional
merit standards require that shares to be listed must have a value of at least £700,000
and there must be an adequate spread of holders of not less than 30 shareholders for
each £1,000,000 of the offering, with a minimum of 100. TH. COuNcrL OF Tm SToCo
EXCHANGE, ADbuSSION OF SEcuturms TO LISTING, Sec. 1, Ch. 2, T 3; Ch.3, t 2.5(c) (1984
ed.). In addition, where a company has a relationship with a substantial shareholder that
could result in a conflict between that shareholder and the general body of shareholders,
the conflict can render the company unsuitable for listing. Id. at Sec. 1, Ch. 2, S16. At
least 25% of the shares have to be in public hands. Id. at Sec. 1, Ch.2, S 8. Even if all
such formal requirements are met, the Exchange retains a discretion to accept or reject
listing applications as unsuitable. Id. at See. 1, Ch.1, T14. The extent to which the ISE
will be able to maintain such standards in the face of EC mutual recognition requirements is open to question. Such merit standards are threatened by EC harmonization.
See FitzSimons, EC Directives Change SecuritiesMarkets, Fin. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at
37, col. 1; Waller, A Babble of Dialects Confuses Global Decisions, Fin. Times, Apr. 19,
1990, at 15, col. 3.
18" Foreign issuers that elect the exemption from Exchange Act reporting available
under Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1990), may not list. See Exchange Act
Release No. 5493 (Oct. 6, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (Oct. 14, 1983).
uN rs FOR DomnSrc AND NON-US. COM1" See and compare NYSE LISmG AGRE
PANIES, NYSE LISTED ComPANY MANuAL §§ 901.01 and 901.02. See also Exchange Act
Release No. 24,634 (June 23, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 29, 1987).
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come timely in any event as a result of The Business Roundtable decision discussed above. 185
B.

Developments in the EC

Over the past decade, at the same time that corporate and
securities regulation in the United States has been undergoing
decentralization, such regulation in Europe has been undergoing
centralization by the EC. In addition to adopting directives on
securities offerings, the EC has been formulating and adopting
directives on company law and takeovers.18 6 These directives
have the potential to change the corporate governance structures
and practices of large public European corporations.
In Europe, shareholder voting rights have long been chimerical except in the United Kingdom, and even the United Kingdom does not have a pure one-share, one-vote regime.18 7 Voting
limitations are common in many continental countries. For example, a single shareholder may not be permitted to vote more
than some small percentage of total common stock holdings.1 81
Friendly outsiders may be given preference shares and other
outsiders may be given shares with no or low voting rights. 189 In
addition, the procedures for voting by proxy limit shareholder
power. In Germany, it is common for the banks to act as depositaries for shares and to then vote such shares pursuant to a general power of attorney. 9 ' Coupled with the large stock interests
held by German banks in major German corporations, this depositary vote gives the* banks, rather than stockholders, the

165

See text and accompanying notes 144-49 supra.

186 Proposalfor a Fifth Council Directive on Company Law, 15 O.J. Eun. COMM,

(No. C 131) 49 (1972); Amended Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive on Company
Law, 26 O.J. EuR COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983); Proposalfor a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeovers, and Other General Bids, 32 O.J. Eua.
Comm. (No. C 64) 8 (1989), COM (90) 416 final (Sept. 10, 1990).
187 See A.F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPE TIVE 320-21 n.4 (1976); Xuereb, Voting Rights: A Comparative Review, 8 COMPANY LAW. 16, 19-20 (1987).
I See A.F. CONARD, supra note 187; Greenhouse, Europe's Buyout Bulge, N.Y.
Times, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
189 See A.F. CONARD, supra note 187; Raun, Dutch Merger Defences May Be SelfDefeating, Financial Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at 6; Maitland, Fortifications Against
Change, Financial Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at 38.
190 Kubler, Juridificationof Structures, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERs 215-17
(G. Teubner ed. 1987); Price, German Vote Curbs Under Fire, Pension & Investment
Age, Apr. 16, 1990, at 19.

1991]

FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW

power to effect changes in corporate control."' 1 Also, the directors of European corporations do not owe a fiduciary duty only

to shareholders, but rather to the corporation as an entity and
also to a broad range of constituencies. 9 2 In addition, directors

of continental corporations have considerable freedom to frustrate unwanted takeover bids. 9 3 For these and other reasons,
until recently there has not been a public market for corporate
control for continental companies.-""
In the United Kingdom, by contrast, there is an active mar-

ket for corporate control, and shareholder rights in takeovers are
protected more rigorously than in the United States. The conduct of directors in contests for corporate control in the United
Kingdom is regulated not only by company law and judicial de-

cisions, but also by the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers
(the City Code), which is supervised by the Panel on Take-overs

and Mergers (the Panel).19 5 The City Code sets forth a limited
number of general principles and detailed rules for the conduct
of a takeover bid. Nevertheless, considerable latitude is left to

the Panel to interpret the propriety of a board's conduct in the
context of a particular bid. The two most important general

191See Grossfeld, Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in
XIII BusnEss AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CO.PHARATrvE LAW 98-101; INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 114-17 (J.C.F. Lufkin & D.
Gallagher, eds. 1990).
192 See F-M BUXBAUM & KJ. HoPr. LEGAL HA0mmoNmz
AND THE BUSNESS ENTERPRISE 177-81 (1988). The German model has been called employee-oriented capitalism. Eckhouse, The Three Faces of Capitalism U.S., Japanese and German Systems
Vie for Supremacy, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 29, 1990, at CL. For the duty of directors
to the corporation in the United Kingdom, see Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421,
[19021 71 L.J. Ch. 846. The board of a U.K. corporation has a specific, statutory duty to
employees. Companies Act, 1985, Ch. 6, s. 309.
19M See Moerman, Proposed EEC Takeover Legislation, Insights, Aug. 1990, at 32;
Maitland, FortificationsAgainst Change, Financial Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at 38.
194 Kellaway, Brussels Faces Uphill Struggle to Remove Takeover Barriers,Financial Times, Nov. 27, 1989, § I, at 7.
19I The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers (1988) [hereinafter "City Code"]. See
Brayne, Tender Offers Involving U.K. Companies, 21 Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. (S
& P) 67, 70 (Apr. 27, 1988). The Panel is a self-regulatory body and the City Code does
not have the force of law. Nevertheless, because of the acceptance and support given to
the City Code and Panel by securities and banking regulators, the Panel's decisions are
obeyed. In addition, since the Panel is a semi-public body, its opinions are subject to
judicial review. MacLachlan & Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe-Practicability,Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 IN'L Lw. 373, 38687 (1989). See Regina v. Panel on Take-Overs & Mergers, ex parte Datafin, [1987] 1 All
E.R. 564.
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principles in the City Code are that the shareholders of an offeree company decide whether or not an offer should succeed,
and all equity holders must be treated equally.196 The board of a
target company is obligated to seek independent outside finanthe subcial advice when a bid is made, and then communicate
19
stance of such advice to the company's shareholders. 7
In addition, after an offer is communicated to the board, or
even if a board has reason to believe an offer is imminent, the
offeree board is prohibited from taking any action without the
approval of shareholders in a general meeting "which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits."'9 8 Because of this anti-frustration provision, the law in the
United Kingdom would appear to favor shareholders, or at least
their freedom of choice when presented with a takeover, to a
greater extent than the law in the United States.199
Despite these historical differences in corporate governance
practice in the United Kingdom and continental countries, the
laws will soon become more congruent because of developments
in the EC. The proposed Fifth Company Law Directive on the
structure and management of large public corporations would
limit the scope for weighted voting rights in such companies,
prohibit the issuance of nonvoting shares except as preference
shares and permit proxies to be given only for a specific meeting.200 Further, proposed amendments would prohibit limitations on voting rights by large shareholders, limit the value of
nonvoting preference shares to 50 percent of total share capital,
prohibit any provision in a company's charter giving certain

' MacLachlan

& Mackesy, supra note 195, at 387-88.

197 City Code, supra note 195, Rule 3.1.
198Id., General Principle 7. Prohibitions

against specific types of "poison pills" are
enumerated in Rule 21. These include the issuance of new shares, the disposition of material assets and'contracts not in the ordinary course of business.
"'9See Takeovers-The Right Way to Regulate the Market, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23,

1989, at 21-22; A Tale of Two Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1989, at A10,col. 1. The
latest draft of the ALI corporate governance project provides that directors of U.S. corporations "may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited
tender offer . . . unless the action would materially disfavor the long-term interests of
the shareholders." AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCn
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02 at 27 (Discussion Draft No. 2, Apr. 20, 1989).
20 See Dutch Firms Warned on Takeover Exposure in a New EC Environment,

Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., Dec. 17, 1990, at 3. See also Amended Proposalfor a Fifth Council
Directive on Company Law, 26 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. C 240) arts. 28(1)(a), 33 (1983).
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shareholders an exclusive right to propose the appointment of
all directors and insure that a majority20of1 shareholders can make
changes to the board of the company.

The proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers also would
alter the regime for corporate accountability.20 2 This directive
would adopt the United Kingdom scheme of regulation, and it is
designed to protect shareholders. Very importantly, all holders
of an offeree company who are in the same position must be
treated equally and the board of an offeree company is required
to act in the interests of all the shareholders and not frustrate
the bid.2 0 3 Any person acquiring one-third of a company's voting

stock is required to make a bid for all shares.
As a result of these developments, by the turn of the century, shareholders could be better protected in Europe than in
the United States. Equity capital might then prefer European
over United States corporations for investment. 20 5 Such a situa-

tion would present an opportunity for the SEC to urge strengthening corporate governance shareholder protections at the federal level.
V. THE

CASE FOR

A
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In recent years, serious questions have been raised about
the United States style of capitalism both by critics and defenders of business. Although the engine which moves the United
States economy may not be broken, many believe that there are
better machines moving the economies of Japan and Germany.20 Some blame corporate managers for the failure of
10 See Cooke, Lowering the Barriers to Euromergers, INsTrnO.moAL INVESTORS,
Apr. 1990, at 61; Obstacles to Hostile Bids Are Target of New EC Strategy, 22 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 909 (June 15, 1990).
202
20
20

32 O.J. Eu&. Coi.zx (No. C 64) 8 (1989), COM (90) 416 final (Sept. 10, 1990).
Id. at arts. 3, 4, p. 10.
Id. at art. 4(1), p. 10.

201 See Longstreth, Changes in ManagerialControl and Stoch Ownership, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct., 19, 1989, at 5, col 1; Obstacles to Hostile Bids Are Target of New EC Strategy, 22
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 909 (June 15, 1990). Investment in European and other foreign stock exchanges has offered superior returns to investment in U.S. stocks. See DuBois, Five Bourses Beat U.S. in 1990, BARRON's, Jan. 7, 1991, at 56. Better corporate
governance mechanisms could make these markets even more attractive. This argument
was made regarding changes in Japanese law to promote shareholder democracy in Note,
Japan'sCompany Law and the Promotionof CorporateDemocracy: A Futile Attempt?,
27 CoLum J. TRASNAT'L L. 195, 197 (1988).
206 AJL MALRnn WrrmN OuR MAs 18-23 (1991); D. VOGL, FLUcrUATiNG FoR-
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United States corporations to compete with foreign corporations; some blame institutional investors for their short-sighted
view of corporate profitability. 20 7 Many scholars and policy makers have been looking to Japan and Germany for models of corporate governance which might be more suitable to an international marketplace than the model of accountability by
managers and directors to stockholders. 0 8
Indeed, from a legal perspective, the model of stockholder
accountability has long been faulty because the split between
ownership and management, combined with managerial control
of the proxy process, made shareholders relatively powerless.
The allegiance of officers and directors to shareholders as corporate owners was a legal fiction which nevertheless gave corporate
structures legitimacy because shareholder rights were enforced
by courts and the SEC. Derivative and securities litigation and
SEC regulation were the real monitoring devices of corporate
managers and directors.
However, litigation and SEC prosecutions are crude corporate governance mechanisms. They may chastise the crooks, but
they will not make corporations more efficient or more productive. A persuasive argument can be made that business is most
effective in lobbying legislators to serve its interests when business is perceived as weak and beleaguered.2"' In the 1980s institutional investors and the takeover mania appeared to menace
corporate performance and capitalization. It is therefore not so
surprising that state legislatures responded favorably to business
requests for relief from shareholder accountability.
Nevertheless, state antitakeover laws have insulated management not merely from takeovers but also from accountability
in conflict of interest situations. The absence of any shareholder
check on management compensation could prove especially
troublesome.2 10 While the proxy review initiative by CalPERS

TUNES 10, 230 (1989).

Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 5; Short-Termism Reappraised, Fin.
Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at 24, col. 2.
20I See Buxbaum, supra note 3; Sykes, Bigger Carrots and Sticks, Fin. Times, Oct.
27

31, 1990, at 17, col. 2.

D. VOGEL, supra note 206, at 290-93.
See Salwen, Breeden Mulls "Bill of Rights" for Holders, Wall St. J., Fob. 28,
1991, at C2, col. 3; Uchitelle, No Recession For Executive Pay, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1991, at D1, col. 3.
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and the USA could ameliorate these conflicts, if shareholder voting rights are not protected the proxy rules cannot be expected
to function as an effective mechanism for shareholder-driven accountability. Moreover, it is questionable whether institutional
investors have any inherently greater claim to control corporate
assets than do corporate managers.
It appears that the SEC is beginning to understand the
need to protect voting rights and reverse its hesitancy about federal preemption in matters impinging upon corporate control.
Current SEC preemption proposals would cover not only takeover reform but also an expansion of the SEC's powers to regulate corporate governance structures for public corporations.""
In addition, the SEC has begun to believe that an effective regulatory policy with regard to internationalization of the market
requires further preemption of state blue sky law. 212
Arguments for federal preemption made in a vacuum, however, are doomed to failure. Federal regulation of corporate governance of large public companies has always been strongly resisted, and the SEC has made inroads in such areas with
difficulty and very slowly, and generally only in response to
some particular market failure. Nevertheless, over the course of
the past fifty years, the Commission has in incremental steps acquired greater power over public corporations. 213 The Business

Roundtable case is the first significant step backwards. Moreover, coincidentally with the decision in that case, the SEC
gained an enforcement tool for which it had long yearnedthe power to bar or suspend directors of public companies who
violate the securities laws from continuing to serve as direc2
tors.

14

It can be expected that in the settlement of such cases,

the SEC will impose its corporate governance ideas on public
companies. 5
Any preemption of state law, however, is likely to be limited
Id.
See Lochner Calls On States to Eliminate Regulatory Burdens, 22 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 622 (Apr. 27, 1990); Breeden Sees Ample Time to Complete Work on
JurisdictionalBill, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 907 (June 15, 1990); SEC To Repropose System to Promote Cross-Border Offerings By Canadians,22 Sec. Reg. & L Rep.
(BNA) 1440 (Oct. 12, 1990).
2 The author made this argument in Karmel, supra note 146.
2
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
2 5 See R. KAE REGULATMON By PROSECTON 219-22 (1982).
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and perhaps come in the form of imposing new obligations on
managers and directors and perhaps even shareholders. For example, mechanisms for requiring a shareholder vote on executive
compensation might challenge managerial autonomy in an area
where business is vulnerable. This could lead to requirements
for shareholder votes on entrenchment devices such as poison
pills, greenmail payments or supermajority antitakeover provisions.216 A statutory reversal of The Business Roundtable case
can also be envisioned.
In the author's opinion, any amendments to the Williams
Act or the proxy rules that give shareholders greater power to
hold managers accountable should inject a new but appropriate
concept .of shareholder responsibility into federal law. At present, institutional investors are only held accountable to their
beneficiaries.217 A concept of shareholder responsibility to the
business enterprise is entirely lacking from the law. This is a
concept that deserves serious discussion. In particular, shareholders should become responsible for sound corporate
capitalizations.
One reason merit regulation has been resisted at both the
federal and state levels is that government bureaucrats have no
particular expertise for passing upon corporate capitalizations. A
structure that might be fair, just and equitable from the standpoint of an unsophisticated shareholder might nevertheless be
unsound from the perspective of creditors or the needs of the
business entity. Many institutional investors are both bondholders and stockholders. They, therefore, have the kind of shortterm conflict of interest that could make them adequate longterm monitors. As Professor Buxbaum has pointed out, they
could become surrogates for the universal German banks. Similarly, the New York Governor's Task Force on Pension Fund In""0A shareholder bill of rights promulgated by the Council of Institutional Investors
calls for shareholder votes to approve any corporate decision related to the finances of a
company that will have a material effect upon the financial position of the company and
the position of the company's shareholders. Shareholder approval is specifically required
for actions such as greenmail, poison pills and golden parachutes. In addition, independent approval of executive compensation is required. Machold, supra note 112, at 752,
760.
217 See Letter From Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program Operation, U.S. Dep't of Labor, toRobert A.G. Monks, Institutional Shareholder Services
(Jan. 23, 1990) regarding responsibilities of plan fiduciaries un'der ERISA fo voting
proxies.
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vestment took the view that institutions should be made to become providers of patient long-term capital. 218
Unfortunately, in our litigious and adversarial society, imposing new responsibilities on a sector of the economy is unlikely to be successful unless those responsibilities are legally enforceable in some way. In the past, the most flexible mechanism
for imposing responsibilities on groups within the corporate
community has been the enforcement of fiduciary duties by
courts and SEC regulation. The concept of shareholder responsibility has little precedent in American law, except with regard to
the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders to minority shareholders.21 9 Nevertheless, there is some basis in the law of other

jurisdictions for the concept of shareholder responsibility to the
corporation as a whole.
The common law tradition treats shareholder voting rights
as a property interest, and therefore each shareholder is entitled
to vote his or her shares in an entirely selfish way or, with few
limitations, to contract with regard to encumbering or limiting
that right.220 By way of contrast, under the laws of certain conti-

nental countries (France and Italy, for example), shareholder
voting rights have a dual nature. Voting and related rights are
granted not to the shareholder as an individual, but in the interests of the company and the general body of shareholders.221 A
correlative to shareholder rights is therefore shareholder duty.
Such a theory of shareholder obligation would fit within the
evolving concept of director duties to nonshareholder
constituencies.
A further articulation of what content any federal corporation law should have requires another article. However, both the
erosion of shareholder rights in the United States and developments in the EC require that the question of a federal corporation law at least be debated at this time. Further, in light of the
institutionalization of the markets and the unhealthy corporate
capitalizations which developed during the 1980s, at least partly
in response to investor pressures, any new initiative toward a
Governor's Task Force, supra note 87, at 27, 57-61.
e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947).
220 See Xuereb, supra note 187, at 16.
221 Id. at 22-27.
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federal corporation law should include the consideration of merit
standards and the responsibility of institutional investors for the
establishment of such standards.
Corporate governance discussions are politically charged because they concern the power to control corporate assets and to
enjoy the emoluments of corporate office. In large public corporations where managers own only a small percentage of the
shares, and a majority of shareholders are institutions, neither
corporate officials nor shareholders are truly owners of the corporation. Their competing claims to control and direct such assets are therefore both open to question. It can be anticipated
that working out an accommodation between these forces will
take some time. Further, the issue involved is no less than the
legitimacy of United States business leadership.
The federal securities laws have long protected investors in
order to inspire confidence in the securities markets and encourage capital formation. Whether or not the time is ripe for a
federal corporation law, it is time to examine what responsibilities should be imposed upon investors in exchange for their
rights.

